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INTRODUCTION
In the past half-century, the Supreme Court has crafted a vein of
jurisprudence virtually eliminating Fourth Amendment protection in
information turned over to third parties-regardless of any subjective
expectation of privacy or confidentiality in the information on the part of
* Juris Doctor 2010, University of Colorado School of Law and Editor-in-Chief,
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law. This essay is adapted from
Tilting at Windmills: A Response to the Unpersuasive Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, a paper
written for Professor Paul Ohm's Information Privacy seminar in Fall 2008. I thank Mimi Poe
for her hard work in helping me to shepherd the essay to completion and Professor Ohm,
Professor Orin Kerr, Professor Bill Pizzi, Chris Soghoian, Wendy Seltzer, Devin Looijen,
Dan McCormick, Avi Loewenstein, Tyler Martinez, Per Larsen, Doug McQuiston, Kathleen
Ellis, and Sara Reid for their helpful feedback. All errors and omissions are my own.
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the revealer.' This so-called "third-party" doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment has become increasingly controversial in light of the
growing societal reliance on the Internet in the United States, where
nearly every transaction requires a user to turn information over to at
least one third party: the Internet service provider ("ISP").
Citing the scholarship that has criticized the third-party doctrine
would make for "the world's longest law review footnote."2 This essay
instead focuses instead on a justification for the doctrine advanced by
prominent computer crime scholar Orin Kerr. In his controversial3 essay
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, Professor Kerr argues that the
third-party doctrine is essential to preclude criminals from substituting
private transactions involving third parties (particularly ISPs) for the
criminals' formerly public transactions, which were subject to police
surveillance.4 This essay examines various descriptive and normative gaps
that potentially undermine the "substitution effects" justification.
I. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
The Supreme Court succinctly articulated the third-party doctrine
in United States v. Miller.
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.'
Normally, a search that yields information of a suspect by law
enforcement officials is subject to an inquiry about whether the
individual possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information.6 Under the third-party doctrine, however, an individual
usually has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information she turns
over to a third party.7
1. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (internal citations
omitted).
2. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5
(2009).
3. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand- Lessons from the
Common Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1199 (2009); Erin
Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine. A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1239 (2009) (responding to Professor Kerr's justification).
4. Kerr, supra note 2, at 573-81.
5. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
6. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). However, the Court has
[Vol. 8
SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
Professor Kerr's primary argument in support of the doctrine is
functional: opportunistic criminals in the absence of the third-party
doctrine would simply substitute public aspects of their crimes (e.g.,
stalking a victim in person) with private transactions (calling the victim
on the phone).' By neutralizing these "substitution effects," the third-
party doctrine arguably ensures the technological neutrality of the Fourth
Amendment by deterring criminals from making opportunistic
substitutions.9 Professor Kerr worries that, without the third-party
doctrine, opportunistic criminals could weave a web of Fourth
Amendment protection and "effectively hide their criminal enterprises
from observation."10
Under this argument, the Fourth Amendment strikes a balance
between privacy and security, drawing a line beyond which law
enforcement officers no longer need seek a warrant before performing an
investigation." Normally, the line is drawn with little difficulty on the
basis of location; for example, officers need a warrant to search a person's
home, but not a public field. 2
However, the line-drawing exercise arguably becomes problematic
when officers need a warrant to obtain information placed in the hands
of third parties.'3 With the increasing potency of technology, a criminal
could plan and execute a crime entirely from her home, knowing that the
police could not send in undercover agents, record phone calls, or watch
Internet activity without a warrant, thus creating "a bubble of Fourth
Amendment protection." 4 With every element of the crime shielded by a
reasonable expectation of privacy, law enforcement officers would be
stuck in an untenable situation, needing probable cause to observe
evidence of the crime but needing to observe the crime to have probable
cause.15 Accordingly, access to evidence from third parties would largely
be eliminated from police investigations. 6
Under the substitution effects justification, the third-party doctrine
rights the balance, forcing elements of crimes that technology has made
private-such as phone calls and Internet usage-back into the public
been inconsistent in applying the doctrine in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that heat emanations from a home, effectively turned over to any
third party that walks by the home, are nonetheless searched by police using a thermal scanner
because the scanner reveals "details of the home").
8. Kerr, supra note 2, at 573, 576.
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 574.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 575-76.
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sphere for the purposes of Fourth Amendment protection, cementing the
aforementioned technological neutrality. 7
Professor Erin Murphy, a vocal critic of The Case for the Third Party
Doctrine, admits that Professor Kerr's insight regarding technological
neutrality and substitution effects is "quite compelling." 8 And Professor
Kerr's jurisprudential clout with the courts in the area of criminal
procedure and technology is well established.'9 As such, it seems likely
that Professor Kerr's novel justification for the third-party doctrine will
garner serious consideration both in academia and the judiciary.
Accordingly, a closer examination of the descriptive and normative
underpinnings of Professor Kerr's argument seems warranted.
II. DESCRIPTIVE PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
The substitution effects justification is descriptively problematic in
both jurisprudential and political senses. First, the Supreme Court has
never embraced the justification, rendering its adoption a radical
departure from existing jurisprudence. Second, it is unclear that the
third-party doctrine's preclusion of substitution effects in fact maintains
any semblance of technological neutrality in the Fourth Amendment.
A. Criminal Motivation: The Supreme Court and Substitution
Effects
The motivations behind criminal behavior are not easily distilled.
20
A particular criminal action may be motivated by a need for privacy, a
need for public exhibition, some combination of both, or something else
entirely. Thus, whether criminals on average opportunistically substitute
private acts for public is a complex empirical question. Professor Kerr,
however, asserts simply that "any smart criminal will exercise the option"
to substitute private acts for public.2' This rhetorical sweep belies the
possibility that, from a policymaking standpoint, the average criminal
might not engage in opportunistic substitutions,22 the third-party
17. See id. at 577.
18. Murphy, supra note 3, at 1241.
19. Professor Kerr's works on criminal procedure and technology have recently been cited
by several federal courts. E.g., U.S. v. Johnson, 584 F.3d 995, 1000 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007)).
20. See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND APPLICATION 409-11, 424-27 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the complex
nature of psychological criminology and the psychosocial factors of criminal behavior).
21. Kerr, supra note 2, at 580.
22. One reason for this possibility is that the average criminal might not be very smart.
As one commentator points out, "The law is designed ... to catch drug dealers who go ninety
miles per hour while carrying a kilogram of cocaine in their trunks-not those who maintain
good operational security and only break one law at a time." E-mail from Christopher
[Vol. 8
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doctrine notwithstanding. 23 Called on this point by Professor Murphy,24
Professor Kerr responds that a criminal's subjective motivations are
irrelevant since third-party transactions shielded by the Fourth
Amendment are always problematic.
25
The debate over subjective intent notwithstanding, Professor Kerr
argues that substitution effects explain the jurisprudential foundations for
the third-party doctrine-in particular, the Supreme Court's opinions in
United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.6 As discussed below,
however, the criminals in those cases arguably did not opportunistically
substitute private acts for public. Accordingly, the Court could not have
considered the substitution effects justification, much less embraced it, in
those seminal third-party doctrine cases. As such, explicit adoption of the
justification by courts in the future would constitute a radical change in
third-party doctrine jurisprudence rather than a consistent application of
past precedent.
1. United States v. Miller
In Miller, a bootlegger purchased equipment for an illicit alcohol
production operation using his checking account.27 Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms Bureau (ATF) agents, who had no warrant, obtained from
the bootlegger's bank the checks used to purchase the equipment.
28
Copies of the checks were introduced at trial,29 and the bootlegger was
convicted." Affirming the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court held
that the bootlegger, by using checks, had effectively turned over
information about his purchases to a third-party (the bank) and,
accordingly, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the checks.
31
Imagining a hypothetical "world without banks," Professor Kerr
argues that the availability of the checking account created a substitution
effect, allowing the bootlegger to substitute a private act (paying with a
check) for a public act (paying with cash).32 Without banks, or so the
Soghoian, Ph.D. Candidate, Indiana University, to Blake Reid (Jan. 8, 2010, 15:57 MST) (on
file with author).
23. The substitution effects justification also presumes that criminals know about and
understand the third-party doctrine--a presumption for which no evidence is presented.
24. Murphy, supra note 3, at 1241-45.
25. Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Murphy,
24 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1229,1233-34 (2009).
26. Id. at 577-79.
27. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976).
28. Id. at 437.
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 436.
31. See id. at 442-43 ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.") (citations omitted).
32. Kerr, supra note 2, at 579.
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argument goes, the bootlegger and the equipment seller would have had
to travel back and forth to their cash "stashes," thus exposing their
activities to the public.33 The check, on the other hand, allowed the two
parties to complete the transaction without the need to visit their
respective stashes, rendering the entire transaction private.34
Further analysis, however, reveals that the use of the check provided
no ex ante privacy from the police to either the bootlegger or the seller.
Furthermore, the use of the check provided less ex post privacy to both
parties than if the bootlegger had used cash.
From an ex ante perspective, the bootlegger needed to travel to
retrieve his checkbook, and the seller needed to travel to the bank to
deposit his check. Even if the bootlegger had traveled to retrieve cash
from his stash, and the seller had traveled to his stash to deposit the cash,
ex ante observation of the travels would have given the ATF agents no
useful information about the transaction itself, nor even any reason to
suspect that something was amiss.
Furthermore, the true privacy interest in Miller was not in travelling
with money, but rather in the transaction itself-the exchange of money
for the illegal bootlegging equipment. The use of a check gave the ATF
agents the ability ex post to discover that the bootlegger had paid the
seller for the still. If the buyer had used cash, the ATF agents merely
would have been able to discover that the bootlegger had withdrawn cash
from his bank account and that the seller had deposited cash in his-or,
in the world without banks, nothing at all.
It is unclear why the bootlegger chose to pay with a check. Perhaps
he was concerned about being robbed while carrying around a substantial
sum of money. Regardless, the less private nature of using a check (from
an ex post perspective) suggests that the bootlegger's payment choice was
probably not motivated by privacy.
2. Smith v. Maryland
Of course, some criminals may in fact augment public acts with
complementary private acts; Smith v. Maryland provides nominal support
for that assertion. But Smith merely illustrates an augmentation of public
behavior with a different and complementary private behavior, rather
than an opportunistic substitution.
In Smith, a robber began to stalk his victim following the robbery,
making threatening phone calls to her home.36 The telephone company,
at the request of Baltimore police (who, again, had no warrant), installed
33. Id.
34. Id.




a pen register device, which tracked the numbers dialed by the robber,
and subsequently caught him calling the victim again.37 On the basis of
this evidence, the police were able to obtain a warrant to search the
robber's home and he was eventually convicted of robbery." The
Supreme Court again affirmed the third-party doctrine, holding that the
robber held no legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dialed since he had turned them over to a third party (the phone
company).39
Professor Kerr argues that the robber intentionally substituted a
private act (stalking the woman over the phone) for a public act (stalking
her in person).4° However, the robber stalked the woman in person after
the robbery41 in addition to stalking her over the phone. There is nothing
to suggest that he undertook the phone stalking in lieu of in-person
stalking; the fact that he undertook both methods of stalking suggests
not that they were substitutes for one another, but rather complementary
activities. Thus, the idea that the robber was motivated by privacy when
he harassed his victim over the phone is speculative.
3. The Supreme Court Has Not Adopted the Substitution
Effects Justification
That Miller and Smith arguably do not involve opportunistic
substitution effects does not necessarily doom future use of the
justification. 2 However, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, the
Supreme Court has never considered the justification, much less
embraced it. Accordingly, the adoption or invocation of the justification
by judges and lawyers should not be viewed as in comport with existing
jurisprudence, but rather as a radical shift demanding a normative
consideration of underlying policy concerns.43
B. Technological Neutrality and Surveillance Myths
Accepting the proposition that substitution effects indeed exist,' it
is nonetheless also questionable whether precluding such effects
maintains any meaningful sense of technological neutrality in the Fourth
37. Id.
38. Id. at 737-38.
39. See id. at 745
40. Kerr, supra note 2, at 578.
41. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
42. E-mail from Orin Kerr to Blake Reid (January 15, 2009, 20:58 MST) (on file with
author).
43. This essay argues that Professor Kerr has not presented a sufficient normative case for
using the justification. See discussion infra Part III.
44. Kerr, supra note 25, at 1234.
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Under Professor Kerr's neutrality argument, precluding substitution
effects prevents savvy criminals from taking advantage of new privacy-
enabling technology, thus righting a hypothetical balance of privacy and
security whenever a given technology would give criminals an advantage
over law enforcement.45
The neutrality argument, however, relies on the false premise that
law enforcement has an unlimited capability to surveil low-tech public
activities and a limited capability to surveil high-tech private activities. As
discussed below-both generally and in the context of Miller and
Smith-the opposite is often true.46 That is, the use of technology often
allows law enforcement, with the power of the third-party doctrine, to
surveil more people more extensively at lesser expense.
1. Low-Tech Langour, High-Tech Hypertrophism
Low-tech surveillance, such as committing officers to stakeouts and
tracking work, is expensive-and funding of boots-on-the-ground police
presence seems to be on a problematic decline in the United States.
Professor William Stuntz points out that "[t]he key problem that faces
American policing today is that not enough money is spent on it."47
For example, in New Orleans, an area devastated by high crime
since Hurricane Katrina, the police department was relegated to
operating out of portable trailers and was even forced to take a collection
to pay for the cleaning of their portable toilets.4" Worse yet, worried
officers had to turn to local donors to replace water-damaged bulletproof
vests and weren't able to get enough to protect the entire force.49
Thousands of alleged criminals were released because the police were
unable to gather sufficient evidence to charge them; only a single
fingerprint examiner and only one firearm examiner remained on the
force as of June 2007, despite the city having experienced a nation-high
90 murders during the previous six months.
50
A recent Wisconsin killing spree illustrates the underfunding
problem in the particular context of low-tech surveillance."1 Law
45. Kerr, supra note 2, at 579-81.
46. For a more generalized articulation of police surveillance capabilities in low-tech and
high-tech circumstances, see Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause. The Diminishing Importance
ofJustification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514 (2010).
47. William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 5 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No.
130, 2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=886170.




51. See Sandy Cullen, Witzel Manhunt Reveals 'Limited Resources' of Police, WIS. ST. J.,
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enforcement agencies were on the lookout for a fugitive in the hours after
he killed a man for allegedly having an affair with the fugitive's ex-
girlfriend. 2 The fugitive successfully evaded the police for nearly 2000
miles before predictably returning a week later to his ex-girlfriend's
Wisconsin home to kill one of her family members.5 3 "It doesn't really
surprise me," commented Michael Scott, the director of the Center for
Problem-Oriented Policing at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.54
"It does kind of point out the limited resources police, under the best of
circumstances, have," Scott continued.5 1 "We sometimes get a false sense
of security about what the police can do to protect us."6 Asked why the
police, knowing that the killer might turn up at the ex-girlfriend's house,
didn't simply surveil the house 24 hours a day, Scott commented that
such surveillance would be a "near impossibility" for police in a rural
community and something even police in a major city would likely be
unable to do. 7 The sheriffs involved agreed, pointing out that no more
than two to four deputies were normally available on a given night to
police the entire county" (which covers over 750 square miles). 9 "We
wouldn't do that on any case," one sheriff commented, "[unless] we
expected there would be a great likelihood of a crime."60
While many police departments seem to be struggling to implement
effective low-tech surveillance (even to prevent serious crimes like
murder, as in the previous example), the high-tech surveillance of third-
party related activities is on the rise. Professor Christopher Slobogin
points out that government agencies have been "eager" since the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001 to experiment with "data-mining," the
process of analyzing information recorded about its citizens through
various transactions.61 In 2003, Congress opened the door for ominous,
Orwellian-sounding programs such as TIA (Total Information
Awareness), ADVISE (Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight,
and Semantic Enhancement), and TALON (Threat and Local
Observation Notice). 62 These programs, recently culminating in the $380








59. Wisconsin Online, Iowa County, Wisconsin, http://www.wisconline.com/counties/
iowa/ (last visited May 10, 2010).
60. Cullen, supra note 51.
61. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317, 317 (2008).
62. Id. at 317-19.
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million Information Fusion Center project, bring together data from the
public and private sector to centralize information about individuals,
including "banking and finance, real estate, education, retail sales, social
services, transportation, postal and shipping, and hospitality and lodging
transactions."63 If operational difficulties64 can be overcome, these
programs could provide law enforcement officers with an unprecedented
view of the daily lives of American citizens-particularly criminals 6 -
and companies like Google and Oracle are poised to fill in the gaps
where the government has failed thus far.66
2. Miller and Smith Revisited
Miller aptly showcases the low-tech/high-tech surveillance
dichotomy. Recall the argument that the bootlegger in Miller substituted
a private act (paying with a check) for a public act (paying with cash).67
The implicit assertion that the bootlegger's malfeasance would have been
easily discovered if the bootlegger had paid with cash68 is only true if the
ATF had infinite surveillance capabilities.
To be precise, the argument goes:
If you need to pay for something in this world, you would need to get
the money to do it: You would need to travel to your stash, pick up
the money, and then travel to the place where you are making your
purchase. If you are the seller, you need to take the money, take it
back to your stash, and store it away for safekeeping. There are public
parts of the transaction on both sides.
69
While there are several public aspects of the transaction, it is unclear
why the ATF would have surveiled any of them-unless it was engaged
in suspicionless, dragnet surveillance of everyone. The bootlegger, for
example, did nothing to arouse ATF suspicions until well after the
transaction was complete.7 ° Thus, it is unlikely that ATF agents would
have uncovered any evidence of the transaction if the bootlegger had paid
with cash.
63. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 324-25.
65. Id. at 323-24.
66. Id. at 327; see also Christopher Sohoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance
Oversight, SLIGHT PARANOIA, Dec. 1, 2009, htp://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-
reasons-for-real-surveiUance.html (describing the extensive surveillance capabilities provided to
law enforcement by telecommunications companies).
67. Kerr, supra note 2, at 579.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. In Miller, the police were actually alerted to the bootlegger's illicit activities by a fire
in his warehouse. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
[Vol. 8
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On the other hand, the bootlegger's use of a check allowed the
agents to find evidence of his transactions ex post without using any
prospective surveillance. That the bootlegger used more advanced
technology (a check) actually broadened the scope and accuracy of the
surveillance techniques available to the agents-without any
corresponding increase in cost. Thus, the third-party doctrine in Miller,
did not maintain technological neutrality, but rather provided the police
with better, cheaper surveillance than they would have had prior to the
technological advance.
Smith provides another example of the low-tech/high-tech
surveillance dichotomy. Recall the argument that the stalker substituted a
private act (over-the-phone stalking) for a public act (in-person
stalking).7 The implicit assertion that the police would have an easy time
catching the stalker in person' is only true if the police had unlimited
surveillance resources. They would have had to canvas the neighborhood,
staking out the victim's house until the stalker showed up, with little
reason to expect that he would do so. It is unlikely that the Baltimore
police, who struggled with record-high crime rates in the 1970s,73 would
have dedicated the resources necessary to catch the stalker in person.
However, the substitution of a high-tech activity (the frequent
harassing phone calls) gave the police the necessary suspicion to canvas
the neighborhood and discover the stalker's identity, allowing them to set
up the pen register on his phone.74 Again, the third-party doctrine
provided not technological neutrality, but a substitution of cheap, hands-
off surveillance for expensive, in-person surveillance, thereby increasing
the evidence that the police were able to obtain.
3. A Thought Experiment
As illustrated by Miller and Smith, the simultaneous lack of
surveillance capabilities for low-tech public acts and overdevelopment in
the high-tech surveillance of private, third-party facilitated acts indicate
that the third-party doctrine may often provide law enforcement officials
with more power to collect evidence about and prevent private crimes
than public crimes. This outcome indicates technological bias, rather
than neutrality, in the third-party doctrine.
71. Kerr, supra note 2, at 578.
72. See id. at 577-78.
73. For example, the robbery rate in Baltimore began a historic increase in the late 1970s,
nearly double that of the neighboring cities of Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. RALPH B.
TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS
AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE 35-36
(2001).
74. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
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To confirm this with a thought experiment, consider crimes
committed entirely over the Internet in comparison to their physical-
world equivalents-for example, hacking into a bank website and
virtually transferring money to another account, versus breaking into and
robbing a brick-and-mortar bank.
With the brick-and-mortar robbery, the police will need to obtain a
warrant and dedicate significant resources to find evidence of the crime
(e.g., the robbers may stash the stolen money and weapons used in the
robbery in one of their own houses) and may need to conduct widespread
low-tech surveillance to prevent the destruction of evidence (e.g., the
robbers may have a sophisticated money laundering operation).
On the other hand, because Internet service providers are now able
to keep accurate logs of all users' online activity,7" the police will be able
to obtain evidence of every step taken during the crime simply by calling
the ISP and asking for it-with no need for a warrant under the third-
party doctrine.76
Contrast the two crimes: with the physical robbery, a public crime
with no third parties involved, the police are placed at least at a nominal
disadvantage in terms of obtaining evidence of the crime; they must
obtain a warrant and dedicate significant officer resources toward
surveillance to obtain the evidence. With the online robbery, a private
crime facilitated with the help of an Internet service provider, a third
party, the police need not obtain a warrant or invest any officer resources
towards surveillance if the ISP chooses to cooperate.
It follows, then, that the third-party doctrine often fails to maintain
technological neutrality, instead giving the police unbounded access to
evidence where the Fourth Amendment previously would have posed
limits.
III. INNOCENCE CONSIDERATIONS: A NORMATVE GAP
The descriptive problems with the substitution effects justification
demand further normative investigation. Indeed, the preclusion of
substitution effects is a normatively problematic basis for crafting Fourth
75. This is no longer a paranoid fantasy for the tin-foil hat set. Professor Paul Ohm
argues that pervasive "complete monitoring" of all user traffic by Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) is a real possibility. See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP
Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (2009). Furthermore, there is a push to require such
logging statutorily. See Kevin Fayle, Congress Pushes (Again) For ISP Data Retention, THE
REGISTER, Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/02/12/
congress-isp-data retention-push/.
76. Of course, this hypothetical experiment ignores the real-world impact of the Wiretap,
Pen Register, and Stored Communications Acts, since they are congressionally mandated
rollbacks to the sweeping nature of the third-party doctrine that probably would have been
unnecessary in the doctrine's absence.
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Amendment jurisprudence because it disproportionately focuses on
criminal activity and efficient law enforcement without adequately
considering the privacy rights of innocent citizens. Although the
prospect of letting a guilty criminal go free often favors expansive search
abilities for the police,77 both the Supreme Court and scholars have
demanded an approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based at
least partly on innocence considerations.
Applying this normative framework to the substitution effects
justification reveals that the third-party doctrine, even if it works as
advertised, may problematically preclude innocent citizens, not just
criminals, from opportunistically substituting private acts for public.
Furthermore, the third-party doctrine may induce innocent citizens to
avoid socially productive uses of technology-perversely causing inverse
substitution effects.
A. Innocence Ideology and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
At least from a textual perspective, the primary purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect the privacy of citizens from
inappropriate governmental intrusion. The Supreme Court agreed in
Schmerber v. California: "The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.
79
The motivation for such an intrusion may simply be the desire for
efficiency by law enforcement officials. George Orwell grimly points out,
though, that the motivation for seeking the power to intrude on the
privacy of citizens indiscriminately may be insidiously self-evident:
[We seek] power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in
the good of others; we are interested solely in power .... We know
that no one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it.
Power is not a means, it is an end .... The object of persecution is
persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of power is
power.8
0
77. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (1983) (noting the proclivity of the Supreme Court to
incorrectly focus on the guilty, including the particularly egregious example of United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
79. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
80. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 263 (Signet Classic 1950) (1949).
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Regardless of the motivation, the Court further acknowledges that
"[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" is
"at the core of the Fourth Amendment" and "basic to a free society."8"
Professor Arnold Loewy argues that the Fourth Amendment serves
to shield the privacy rights of innocent civilians, and that the guilty are
merely "incidental beneficiaries" of the amendment's protections.82
Indeed, the amendment puts a textual thumb on the scale, favoring the
privacy of innocent citizens over the desire to catch and punish criminals.
To illustrate this point, imagine that a robbery is committed in a
small, isolated town with one thousand homes. The police are certain
that the culprit lives in town, but have no idea who he or she is.
Accordingly, the police search every home in town for the stolen goods,
and eventually find them, thus identifying the robber.
From the perspective of catching and punishing criminals, the
situation is a success on two levels. An ex ante evaluation would predict
that the searches collectively have a one-hundred percent likelihood of
finding the stolen goods; an ex post evaluation would reveal that the
searches indeed succeeded in finding the goods and catching the
criminal. Yet, the searches almost certainly would violate the Fourth
Amendment.83 As a result, evidence of the stolen goods would be
excluded from use in prosecuting the robber,84 who would likely get off
scot-free despite damning evidence of his criminal conduct.
This non-intuitive result is arguably a positive one, however. An ex
ante evaluation would predict that an individual search has a one-tenth of
one percent chance of catching the criminal and a ninety-nine point nine
percent chance of violating the privacy of an innocent citizen; an ex post
evaluation would reveal that, indeed, nine-hundred and ninety-nine of
the searches violated the privacy of innocent civilians and failed to catch
the criminal.85 Such a result would be too a heavy price to pay in the eyes
81. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
82. Loewy, supra note 77, at 1229-1230.
83. The Fourth Amendment would govern the search of each house. See Lewis v. U.S.,
385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) ("Without question, the home is accorded the full range of Fourth
Amendment protections."). Warrantless searches of homes for objects (the stolen goods, in
this case) are generally prohibited absent probable cause. Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 33
(1925) ("Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house,
fimishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are
held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.") Though
probable cause is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules," Illinois V.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), it is hard to imagine a court considering a one percent
likelihood "probable" in any sense of the word.
84. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1963).
85. Of course, if the police were to stop the search immediately after finding the evidence
for which they were searching, they might search fewer than all the homes. Then again,




of the Fourth Amendment.
This example underscores Professor Loewy's point: inherent in the
Fourth Amendment is a focus on protecting the privacy of innocent
citizens. Even when a search tactic is guaranteed to be successful in
catching a criminal, the Fourth Amendment may preclude it if it is likely
to violate the privacy of innocent citizens. 6 Accordingly, focusing solely
on the capture of the guilty when evaluating Fourth Amendment
doctrine is insufficient; a holistic approach should consider the privacy of
innocent citizens as well.
B. The Substituting Innocent Citizen
The innocence rubric reveals an unanticipated consequence of the
third-party doctrine: if it precludes criminals from opportunistically
substituting private acts for public, it may do the same to innocent
citizens.
Assume arguendo that the bootlegger in Miller and the stalker in
Smith engaged in opportunistic substitutions in committing their crimes.
It might be tempting, then, to justify the third-party doctrine by solely
evaluating the judicial outcomes-in both cases, the criminal was
captured and convicted, a desirable result. But consider the innocent
citizens whose records were searched in each case. Perhaps the
bootlegger wrote alimony checks to an ex-wife, the amounts of which
suddenly became known to the police. Perhaps the stalker made calls to
his therapist, revealing their relationship. Everyone to whom the
bootlegger wrote checks and who wrote checks to the bootlegger had
their identities revealed to the police.87 Everyone to whom the stalker
placed a call had her identity similarly revealed." Presumably, all of these
people were innocent, or at least not suspected by law enforcement of
having committed any crime. Perhaps many of them had chosen to use
checks and telephones to substitute innocent private acts for previously
public acts. The police violated the privacy of each of those individuals.
It is not difficult to imagine that the third-party doctrine could
facilitate even more insidious privacy violations. For example, a journalist
may be working on a story on police corruption. In retaliation, the police,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, could log everyone that the
86. That the criminal "incidentally benefits," as Professor Loewy puts it, by having the
evidence against her excluded from use in prosecution is not the goal of the Fourth
Amendment, but merely a necessary incentive to prod the police into being reasonably sure
that their tactics do not violate the privacy of innocent citizens. See Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.") (citation omitted).
87. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1976).
88. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
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journalist calls-and reveal the identity of a previously anonymous
whistleblower in their department.
It is quantitatively difficult to compare the privacy costs to innocent
citizens with the cost to society of letting some criminals go free. Of
course, the courts in the foregoing cases both decided (perhaps
unconsciously) that the cost to society was higher. And there are ways to
protect the privacy of individuals associated in private transactions with
criminals. For example, the police in Smith could have filtered out all
phone calls except to the victim. 9 But as a normative matter, it seems
essential to balance the efficiency gains for law enforcement against the
privacy costs to innocent citizens prior to invoking the third-party
doctrine.
C. Self-Flagellation and Reverse Substitution Effects
It is possible that the aforementioned privacy costs of the third-
party doctrine to innocent citizens may cause them to stop making
socially productive, privacy-enhancing substitutions. Even more
perversely, though, it may, in the long run, cause them to make reverse
substitutions-from private acts to public acts-to avoid abuse by the
police.
Judge Richard Posner's reductio ad absurdum argument considers the
hypothetical consumer seeking absolute privacy: a veritable hermit who
gives up his driver's license (because of the required disclosure of personal
information to the DMV), his job (because of the required verification of
references), his credit cards (because of the required submission to an
intrusive credit check), his phone (because of possible government
surveillance) and so on.9" The Internet provides a poetic illustration of
such a consumer: anonymous Slashdot91 poster "KlaymanDK," who
queried the digital masses about the privacy costs of third-party
89. Of course, the police are not necessarily likely to implement filters-and filters may
be difficult or impossible to implement in some situations. In Payner v. United States, an IRS
special agent on the hunt for a narcotics trafficker arranged an illegal scheme to search the
banker's briefcase without the banker's knowledge, photographing over 400 pages of
documents. 447 U.S. 727, 730 (1980). Though the documents lead to the conviction of the
scofflaw, it's unclear that the IRS was actually looking for him in the first place. Thus, the IRS
likely could not have filtered the evidence to protect details of the bank transactions of
innocent citizens. The Colorado Supreme Court recently used this rationale to reject the third-
party doctrine in context of a police search of over 5,000 tax returns seized from a tax preparer,
pointing out that the search was an impermissible "fishing expedition" into the files of clients,
"the substantial majority of which were free from any evidence of wrongdoing." See People v.
Guiterrez, 222 P.3d 925, 944 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) ("[T]he limitations imposed by the
warrant on the scope of the search were ineffective, as the officers seized all tax returns in [the
preparer's] custody, including those not authorized by the warrant.").
90. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 247-48
(2008).




Over the last decade or so, I have strived to maintain my privacy. I
have uninstalled Windows, told my friends 'sorry' when they wanted
me to join Facebook, had a fight with my brother when he wanted to
move the family email hosting to Gmail, and generally held back on
my personal information online. But since, amongst all of my friends,
I am the only one doing this, it may well be that my battle is lost
already. Worse, I'm really putting myself out of the loop, and it is
starting to look like self-flagellation. Indeed, it is a common
occurrence that my wife or friends will strike up a conversation based
on something from their Facebook 'wall' (whatever that is).
Becoming ever more unconnected with my friends, live or online, is
ultimately harming my social relations. I am seriously considering
throwing in the towel and signing up for Gmail, Facebook, the lot. If
"they" have my soul already, I might as well reap the benefits of this
newfangled, privacy-less, AJAX-2.0 world. It doesn't really matter if
it was me or my friends selling me out. Or does it?
92
KlaymanDK is an example of a presumably innocent citizen worried
about turning personal data over to third parties-particularly
corporations. He seems concerned about privacy in general; of course,
there are many ways for corporations to violate privacy that don't
implicate the Fourth Amendment, such as losing data to identity thieves.
However, several responses to KlaymanDK's question indicate that
Fourth Amendment concerns lurk just beneath the surface for similarly
privacy-conscious innocent citizens:
How do you know your lawful activities will always be lawful? Every
time I see someone react with 'I'm not a criminal' fallacy, all I can
think of is the question "Are you now, or have you ever been
associated with a member of the Muslim faith?" We're not far away
from a witch hunt of that flavor.
93
Applied for a job, while sharing a name with a convicted criminal
92. Posting of kdawson to Slashdot, Give Up the Fight For Personal Privacy',
http://yro.slashdot.org/artide.pl?sid=08/10/07/2112249 (Oct. 7, 2008, 17:29) (emphasis
added). Facebook is a "social-networking" website available at http://www.facebook.com; for a
useful primer on the privacy concerns surrounding Facebook, consult Catherine Rampell,
What Facebook Knows That You Don't, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2008, at A15. Gmail is an
Internet-based free e-mail service operated by Google available at http://www.gmail.com. For
further information on Gmail privacy concerns, consult the website Gmail Is Too Creepy,
http://www.gmail-is-too-creepy.com/. Finally, AJAX, or Asynchronous JavaScript and XML,
is a term for the collective programming techniques that underlie many modern websites like
Gmail and Facebook. For a lay-accessible explanation, see What is Ajax?, RIASPOT.COM, July
7, 2008, http://www.riaspot.com/artides/entry/What-is-Ajax-.
93. Posting of Hyppy to Slashdot, Give Up the Fight For Personal Privacy?,
http://yro.slashdot.org/artide.pl?sid=08/10/07/2112249 (Oct. 7, 2008, 18:37).
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who lives near you? Been pulled over by the police or sent fines for
speeding, because someone cloned your car's plates?
94
[Something may] happen in the future to make currently acceptable,
moral, lawful behavior illegal.
95
I manage to stay out of friend's pictures for this reason.... [k]eep in
mind that [law enforcement] agencies do look at it during criminal
investigations, and use it as evidence. Just some things to keep in
mind ... 96
Perhaps Professor Loewy was prophetic when he predicted that the
police could use evidence wrongfully obtained about innocent citizens
"for parlor games, practical jokes, or harassment."97 These Slashdot users
are not just worried about the inability to use Facebook or Gmail-they
are worried about police harassment, religious persecution, and false
prosecution. And if their self-flagellating avoidance of beneficial
technology becomes pervasive, the social costs may be immense. 98
Even though the third-party doctrine may not be solely to blame for
these users' concerns about online privacy, the chilling effect of the
doctrine on legitimate, socially productive activities such as the usage of
data-collecting Internet web sites by innocent, privacy seeking consumers
must also be considered when invoking the preclusion of substitution
effects as a justification for the third-party doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Articulating a viable justification for the third-party doctrine is
tempting to scholars, particularly given the mountain of critical
scholarship indicating that no such justification exists; to justify the
doctrine successfully is to triumph over the conventional wisdom.
Professor Kerr's argument for the substitution effects justification is
compelling in many ways, but its adoption must be tempered by
consideration of its descriptive and normative problems.
94. Posting of Anonymous Brave Guy to Slashdot, Give Up the Fight For Personal
Privacy?, http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/10/07/2112249 (Oct. 7, 2008, 19:01).
95. Posting of maillemaker to Slashdot, Give Up the Fight For Personal Privacy?,
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/10/07/2112249 (Oct. 7, 2008, 17:54).
96. Posting of NJRoadfan to Slashdot, Give Up the Fight For Personal Privacy?,
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/10/07/2112249 (Oct. 7, 2008, 18:36).
97. Loewy, supra note 77, at 1253.
98. Even citizens looking for an intermediate approach between shunning technology and
giving up their privacy are faced with a dizzying array of technical considerations. See, e.g.,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, What Can I Do To Protect Myself?., https://ssd.eff.org/
3rdparties/protect (last visited May 10, 2010).
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